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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The caption contains the names of all parties to the
appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals. The defendant in the trial
court was First Security Mortgage Company. After the final judgment was entered in the trial court, Leucadia Financial Corporation was substituted for First Security Mortgage Company as the
defendant.
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (j) and 78-2-2(5) (1987).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court of Appeals correctly interpret the
standard form Earnest Money Sales Agreement to preclude the
buyer's right to specific performance?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Association of Realtors adopts the Petitioner's
statement of the "Nature of the Case" and "Course of Proceedings"
to the extent it is consistent with the "Statement of the Case"
contained at pages 1-2 of the Brief of Respondent in Opposition
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("Br. in Opp.").
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

The Utah Association of REALTORS1 (UAR) is a non-

profit corporation consisting of local boards of REALTORS, their
members, and other licensed real estate professionals in this
state. Its purposes include maintaining high standards of conduct
in the real estate profession and exerting effectively a combined
influence upon matters affecting real estate in this state. (See

1

REALTOR is a federally registered collective membership

mark.
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Affidavit of L. Alma Mansell (previously filed with the Court),
15 3 & 4.)
2.

The UAR and its member boards comprise approxi-

mately 3,500 real estate brokers and agents within the state of
Utah. (Id. S 3 . )
3.

The UAR is a member of the National Association

of REALTORS, a national association designed to maintain high
standards of conduct in the transaction of real estate business
and to provide a facility for education, research and exchange
of information for those engaged in the recognized branches of
the real estate business.
4.

(id. f 5.)

The state of Utah, through the Utah Real Estate

Commission, created pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-5.5 (1953,
as amended), and the Utah Attorney General, has prepared and
approved a standard for Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("standard
form").

The standard form must be used by all licensed real

estate brokers and salesagents in real estate transactions conducted in this state, as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-20
(1953, as amended) . The standard form is used in the vast majority of real estate transactions conducted by the members of the
UAR.

(See Affidavit of L. Alma Mansell 5 6.)
5.

On or about February 20, 1987, First Security

Mortgage Company, as seller, and William R. Kelley, Jr., as buyer,
executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the purchase and
- 2 -

sale of certain residential real property in Park City, Utah.
(See Record ("R.") at 14-21 •) The agreement was on the standard
form approved by the Real Estate Commission of the state of Utah
and the Utah Attorney General. (See Affidavit of L. Alma Mansell,
App. "A" 1 6 . )
6.

Paragraph N of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement

stated, in pertinent part:
Both parties agree that, should either party
default in any of the covenants or agreements
herein contained, the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or
accrue from enforcing or terminating this
Agreement, or in pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by applicable law, whether such
remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
(R. at 17 I N . )
7.

Before closing, a survey disclosed that there

was a boundary discrepancy.
8.

(See R. at 81, 143, 150.)

Also before closing, neighboring property owners

cut off the water supply to the property, causing a poind on
the property to dry up, thereby damaging the property.

(See R.

at 45, 50-53, 82.)
9.

The petitioner, Mr. Kelley, brought this action

seeking a declaration of the parties' respective rights and obligations under the Agreement, specific performance of the Agreement
and damages for alleged breaches of the Agreement as described
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above, and also tendered to the court the amount required to
close the transaction.
10.

(See R. at 1-11, 68-71.)

The trial court granted Kelley summary judgment

on his claim for specific performance.
11.

(See R. 562-64.)

First Security accepted Kelley's down payment

and conveyed the property to Kelley.

(See Brief of Respondent,

No. 880534-CA (Utah Ct. App.), appendix A.)
12.

Thereafter, Leucadia Financial Corporation was

substituted as defendant for First Security and appealed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kelley.
fSee R. 844-49.)
13.

The issues on appeal were whether Kelley made a

sufficient tender of performance by the closing date and, if
not, whether the trial court erred in ordering specific performance.

(See Brief of Appellant, No. 880534-CA (Utah Ct. App.)

at 1.)
14.

The Utah Court of Appeals did not reach the issues

concerning Kelley's tender of performance but instead focused
on paragraph H of the Agreement, regarding the respective rights
of Buyer and Seller in the event a title defect was discovered.
Paragraph H reads as follows:
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is
elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for
a standard form ALTA policy of title insurance
to be issued by such title insurance company
as Seller shall designate. Title policy to
- 4 -

be issued shall contain no exceptions other
than those provided for in said standard
form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted
under the final contract of sale. If title
cannot be made so insurable through an escrow
agreement at closing, the earnest money shall,
unless Buyer elects to waive such defects
or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and
this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated.
Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge.
15.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Kelley's remedy

under paragraph H was limited to a refund of his earnest money
deposit, not specific performance, because title to the property
could not be made insurable without exceptions for defects and
because Kelley refused to waive any title defects.

Kelley v.

Leucadia Fin. Corp., No. 880534-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App.
Jan. 5, 1990).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The interpretation given the standard form Earnest
Money Sales Agreement by the Utah Court of Appeals improperly
deprives buyers of their right to specific performance.
ARGUMENT
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals that Mr.
Kelley has asked the Court to review was based on that court's
interpretation of the standard form.

The standard form is a

principal tool of the trade of the UAR's members. The UAR therefore has a critical interest in how the standard form is interpreted .
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The UAR feels that, with respect to one significant
provision of the standard form, paragraph H, the court's interpretation was either wrong or, at best, sufficiently unclear
so as to cast doubt on the enforceability of the entire form.
Of utmost concern is the court's apparent interpretation of that
paragraph which could eliminate the right of a buyer to obtain
specific performance from the seller.
This Court has consistently upheld a buyer's right to
specifically enforce a purchase contract.

See, e.g.. Eliason

v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980); Tanner v. Baadsaaard. 612
P.2d 345 (Utah 1980); Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977)
(under analogous facts). Yet, in its interpretation of paragraph
H, the Court of Appeals has in effect said that, if there are
title problems or damage to the property, the seller can refuse
to correct them, and the buyer's only remedy is to waive the
defect or damage, or walk away from the transaction.

Under the

court's interpretation of paragraph H, the buyer must waive any
title defects and, of course, also waive any remedy he might
otherwise have for such defects.
Utah law.

Such a result is contrary to

See, e.g.. Castacno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1284

(Utah 1976) ("The rule has long been established that a vendee
has the right to insist upon performance by the vendor to the
extent the latter is able to perform with an abatement in the
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purchase price equal to the value of the deficiency or defect")
(citations omitted).
In Ace Realty, Inc. v. Loonev, 531 P.2d 1377 (Okla.
1974), the court found that a contractual provision substantially
similar to paragraph H of the standard form, was provided for
the benefit of the buyer rather than the seller.

By allowing

the buyer the right to obtain specific performance from the
seller, with an abatement for a title defect, the seller would
appropriately be denied the ability to defeat unilaterally a
contract by refusing to correct a title defect.
Beyond the policy considerations associated with denying
the seller the right to defeat a contract as stated in Ace Realty,
Inc. v. Looney, 531 P.2d at 1381, there is the language in paragraph H of the standard form which reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions
other than those provided for in said standard form,
and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the
final contract of sale. If the title cannot be made
so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing,
the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive
such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer,
and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated.
(R. at 15 (emphasis added).)
In summary fashion the Court of Appeals apparently
found that title could not be made insurable through an escrow
at closing.

See Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., No. 880534-CA,
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slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1990).

The facts relevant

to that issue were never developed in the trial court.
An escrow at closing which adjusts the purchase price
or reduces closing proceeds to the seller, is a very common and
practical means of correcting a title defect.

However, whether

through an escrow at closing a seller could cure a title defect
by means of an adjustment in the purchase price, is an appropriate
factual question for a trial court to consider in a suit for
specific performance. The record below reveals no such finding,
which the UAR believes is vital.
The UAR believes that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of paragraph H is overly restrictive.

The opinion

does not suggest or intimate that under certain facts, specific
performance with an abatement would be available as a remedy to
a buyer.

On the contrary, the opinion suggests that the only

remedy ever available to a buyer under paragraph H, is to waive
the defect or cancel the transaction.

The condition precedent

to that waiver or cancellation, e.g., that the title be uninsurable through an escrow at closing, was not expressly discussed or analyzed by the court.
The Court of Appeals' interpretation of paragraph H
to deny Kelley specific performance in effect read paragraph N
out of the standard form.

Paragraph N allows a party to bring

suit to enforce the agreement if the other party defaults in
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any of the covenants or agreements contained in the standard
form.

The failure of a seller to convey clear title constitutes

a default by the seller of its covenant to furnish "good and
marketable title.H

Thus, under paragraph N, Kelley was entitled

to bring an action to specifically enforce the agreement.

If

the consequence of his election to enforce the agreement under
paragraph N meant that, under paragraph H, he was required to
waive any title defect, then the court could tailor its order
of specific performance accordingly. But that was never an issue
before the Court of Appeals because First Security settled
Kelley's

claim

that

he was entitled

to damages

for First

Security's failure to convey clear title.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' decision has serious implications
for the real estate industry. Buyers consistently use the standard form to obtain loans to finance their purchases.

If the

interpretation of the standard form is unclear or if that form
cannot be specifically enforced, as the Court of Appeals has
implied, then real estate transactions using the standard form
become uncertain, and lenders and the parties to the transactions
cannot rely on the standard for as a binding contract.
Mr. Kelley filed this action to preserve whatever rights
he may have had under the standard form.

Yet merely by filing

this action, under the Court of Appeals' decision, he lost his
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right to purchase the property.

Thus, the Court of Appeals'

decision punishes buyers who seek the aid of a court to declare
and enforce their rights under the standard form.2
For the foregoing reasons, the UAR believes that the
Court should reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this

(I

day of December, 1990.

D. FRANK WILKINS, Esq,
DAVID W. JOHNSON, Esq,

(Original signature)

2
The UAR takes no position on whether, under the facts
of this case, First Security breached the agreement and whether
Kelley was in fact entitled to damages. The parties' settlement
of Kelley's damage claim moots those issues. But the UAR believes that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the standard form so as to deny specific performance to a buyer merely
because he insisted on enforcing rights he thought he had under
that form.
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